The compound-cue model of cognitive control in task switching explains switch cost in terms of a switch of task cues rather than of a switch of tasks. The present study asked whether the model generalizes to Lag 2 repetition cost (also known as backward inhibition), a related effect in which the switch from B to A in ABA task sequences is costlier than is the same switch in CBA task sequences. The model suggests that Lag 2 repetition cost should be absent from AЈBA task sequences, in which AЈ and A are different cues for the same task. The cost is robust on such sequences, which suggests that cueindependent, task-specific representations are necessary for explaining task-switching performance and that the compound-cue model has limited explanatory power.
In task-switching procedures for studying cognitive control, the participant performs a simple task on each of a (usually large) number of trials. The stimulus on each trial might be a random digit, for example, and the task might be either to judge the digit as even or odd or to judge the digit as higher or lower than a criterion. Which of these tasks to perform is indicated by a cue of some kind, either presented explicitly or coded in memory. In general, researchers aim to exercise the control processes that select the correct task for the current trial in a context in which task-related processing is simple enough that effects of controlrelated processing show through behaviorally.
From the outset (see Monsell, 2003) , task-switching research has focused on measuring, manipulating, and trying to explain switch cost, the difference between performance on switch trials, in which the task is different than it was on the previous trial, and performance on repeat trials, in which the task is the same as it was on the previous trial. The interest in switch cost was originally driven by the "reconfiguration" metaphor, which posits a process charged with a "sort of mental 'gear-changing'" (Monsell, 2003, p. 135 ) that needs to run only on switch trials. More recently, several alternative theoretical frameworks have evolved that explain switch cost as a side effect of processes not directly relevant to cognitive control (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; Altmann & Gray, 2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003) .
One alternative that has drawn considerable attention is the compound-cue model (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Logan & Bundesen, 2003 , 2004 Logan & Schneider, 2006; Schneider & Logan, 2005 , 2007 . The model specifies three functional processing stages: task cue encoding, trial stimulus encoding, and use of the two encoded percepts as a compound cue for retrieving a response from memory. Switch cost is attributed to repetition priming's facilitation of the encoding of a repeated task cue, an idea familiar from earlier work (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Sohn & Anderson, 2001) . The model's innovative premise is that performance can be explained without appeal to alternation of task representations from trial to trial. Schneider and Logan (2005) , for example, framed the model in such terms in an article entitled "Modeling Task Switching Without Switching Tasks," in which they wrote that "there is no need to invoke different task sets or to switch task sets for task alternations" (p. 347) and that "priming of cue encoding and compound cue retrieval appear to be sufficient to explain task-switching performance in the explicit task-cuing procedure" (p. 358).
The empirical evidence for the compound-cue model comes largely from a procedure introduced by Logan and Bundesen (2003) and, concurrently, with a different focus, by Mayr and Kliegl (2003) , in which cues are mapped 2:1 to tasks; thus, for example, the cue even odd might signify the even-odd task on one trial and the cue parity might signify the even-odd task on a different trial. With this 2:1 cue-task mapping, the cue can switch from one trial to the next while the task repeats; this mapping affords a measure of cue-switch cost (cue-switch trials vs. noswitch trials), which can then be compared with task-switch cost (task-switch trials vs. no-switch trials). Cue-switch cost is substantial and often is not reliably smaller than is task-switch cost (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Logan & Bundesen, 2003 , 2004 Logan & Schneider, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Schneider & Logan, 2005) , a finding consistent with the proposal that repetition-primed cue encoding accounts for a large proportion of task-switch cost.
The model's innovative premise, that task representations apart from cues are not necessary for explaining task-switching performance, implies that other effects linked to switching tasks, beyond just switch cost, should be linked to switching cues. This implication is tested here with respect to Lag 2 repetition cost, the finding that, in a design with three tasks instead of the usual two, the switch from B to A in an ABA task sequence is slower than is the switch from B to A in a CBA task sequence (Arbuthnott, 2005; Gade & Koch, 2005, in press; Hubner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003; Koch, Philipp, & Gade, 2006; Mayr, 2002; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003) . One functional interpretation of this effect is that, as the system is switching from A to B, it may inhibit A to facilitate selection of B. The resulting inhibition then persists, which causes slowed responding on an immediate return to A (in an ABA sequence).
The specific prediction tested here is that Lag 2 repetition cost should be absent on an AЈBA sequence, in which AЈ and A are different cues for the same task. Per the compound-cue model, performance on an AЈBA sequence should resemble performance on a CBA sequence, because in both cases the cue switches across the intervening B task; if what is inhibited is the Lag 2 cue, this cue switch should release the inhibition and should cancel Lag 2 repetition cost. However, if what is inhibited is a Lag 2 task representation that is independent of the cues that signify it, the cue switch should not release the inhibition and Lag 2 repetition cost should be present on an AЈBA sequence.
Two studies to date have offered evidence on this prediction. Mayr and Kliegl (2003) , in their Experiment 3, and Gade and Koch (in press ), in both their experiments, found Lag 2 repetition cost on AЈBA sequences and therefore weigh in against the compound-cue model. However, the model has evolved in a direction that calls for further testing. Mayr and Kliegl, it turns out, also found that task-switch cost was substantially larger than was cue-switch cost, which suggests that the conceptual reduction of task-switch cost to cue-switch cost was perhaps not so straightforward; in response, Logan and Bundesen (2004) introduced a "mediator" construct, a mediator being an intervening symbol retrieved from memory when cues are "nontransparent," meaning, roughly, when they are unpracticed in association with the tasks they signify. For example, Mayr and Kliegl used the letters G and S to signify a colormatching task, and Gade and Koch used the symbols $ and % to signify a task for judging the stimulus as letter or number. Logan and Bundesen proposed that unpracticed cues, such as these, would trigger retrieval of a task symbol (the mediator), which would then form a compound cue with the trial stimulus for retrieving the correct response. If this mediator happened to switch on task-switch trials but not on cue-switch trials, cue-switch trials would be subject to repetition priming-now of the mediator, rather than of the cue-which would account for any differences between cue-switch cost and task-switch cost.
This mediator mechanism was in some sense a task representation-there being, by design, one mediator per task-and was therefore a departure from the original operating principles of the compound-cue model (Logan & Bundesen, 2003) . Nonetheless, Schneider and Logan (2005) , for example, subsequently reiterated the original proposal that alternating task representations were unnecessary for explaining performance in their task-switching procedure; this reiteration leaves some ambiguity about what mechanisms were, at that point, considered the heart of the model. Fortunately for present purposes, one core assumption of the model, that mediators are unnecessary when cues are transparent, seems to remain clear; this assumption was reinforced by Logan and Schneider (2006) , who wrote that "nontransparent cues require an extra step-mediator retrieval-that is not required for transparent cues" (p. 348). In the present study, I therefore used transparent cues, in particular those used by Logan and Bundesen (2004) in their comparison of transparent cues with nontransparent cues of the kind used by Mayr and Kliegl (2003) . Thus, any Lag 2 repetition cost on AЈBA sequences that arose in our study can be interpreted in terms of the original, innovative proposal that cue encoding, stimulus encoding, and response retrieval are sufficient for explaining task-switching performance.
My procedure uses a run-based design, extending previous work on Lag 2 repetition costs. In previous studies, a task cue always accompanied every stimulus; here, a cue is presented on the first trial of a run to indicate which task should be performed for that whole run. This design should help development of some new constraints on models of Lag 2 repetition cost, because it allows separation of cue-related processes (which run their course on Trial 1 of the run) from stimulus-and response-related processes (which are required on all trials of the run). Thus, if Lag 2 repetition cost were reliable on Trials 2 and later of a run, this would suggest that stimulus-and response-related processes are affected by inhibition. If, in addition, Lag 2 repetition cost was larger on Trial 1 than on Trials 2 and later, this would suggest that cue-related processing is also affected. In context of this run-based design, the "XBA" notation (X ϭ AЈ, B, or C) will designate three successive runs of trials, the first performed under the task cued by X, the second performed under Task B, and the third performed under Task A.
Method

Participants
A sample of 36 undergraduates from Michigan State University participated in exchange for partial credit toward a course requirement. An additional participant was excluded from analysis for not maintaining a sessionwise accuracy of 90%.
Materials
The stimulus presented on each trial was one digit from the set 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 , which was displayed in either red or blue ink in the center of a dark computer screen. Stimulus selection was randomized subject to the constraint that the same stimulus (defined by its digit and color) could not be displayed on two successive trials.
There were three tasks-color, parity, and magnitude (higher or lower than 5)-one of which was performed on each trial. For each task, there were two possible cues: color and red blue for Task 1; parity and even odd for Task 2; and magnitude and high low for Task 3. The task for each run of trials (see below) was selected subject to the constraint that the same task could not be selected for two successive runs (i.e., every run was a switch run). After the task for a run was selected, the cue for that task was randomly selected from the two possible candidates.
Participants responded by pressing the Z and / keys of a standard keyboard. The mapping from stimulus categories to keys was randomized between participants, and the words within the twoword task cues were ordered for congruency with the mapping.
Procedure
Trials were grouped into runs, with the same task performed within each run. Run length in trials was determined by adding 2 to a sample from an exponential distribution with mean 2, which produced a minimum run length of 2, a mean run length of 4, and an empirical maximum run length (averaged across participants) of 19. The exponential distribution of run lengths served to flatten the hazard function for occurrence of the next task cue, such that there was minimal information available to the system about when the next cue would appear; this fact clarifies the interpretation of run length effects on cue-related processing, because it suggests that such effects are unlikely to be a function of expectancy or of phasic alertness increasing within a run (Altmann, 2002) . On each trial within a run, the participant's response triggered immediate onset of the stimulus for the next trial.
A task cue was presented before each run and indicated the task for that run. The cue appeared immediately after the response for the last trial of the previous run, remained visible for 500 ms, and then disappeared, after which the Trial 1 stimulus appeared immediately.
There were 26 runs per block and 26 blocks per session, with a session lasting roughly 45 min. After each block the participant was given accuracy feedback and a chance to rest. The feedback message encouraged the participant to be more accurate if accuracy for that block was below 90% and to go a little faster if accuracy for that block was 100%.
Measurement and Design
Response latencies were measured from onset of the trial stimulus to the participant's response and were trimmed by taking medians. The first two runs of a block were excluded from analysis, as were error trials and trials after error trials. An initial practice block, not counted among the 26 of the session proper, was also excluded.
The full design was a four-way factorial, with all factors within participants. The main factor of interest was sequence, with levels AЈBA, ABA, and CBA: In an AЈBA sequence, the A run repeated the task from the AЈ run but switched the cue; in an ABA sequence, the Lag 0 (current) A run repeated both the task and the cue from the Lag 2 A run; and in a CBA sequence, the A run switched both the task and the cue relative to the C run. The second factor was trial, meaning the serial position of a trial in the Lag 0 run. The levels were 1, 2, 3, and 4; Trial 4 was the last trial for which there were observations for all cells of the design for all participants. The third factor was Lag 1 run, meaning the length of the run preceding the Lag 0 run (i.e., the B run in an AЈBA, ABA, or CBA sequence). The levels were 2 and 3ϩ, with 2 being the minimum run length in the procedure and 3ϩ including all Lag 1 runs of three or more trials; this was the finest grained partitioning of this factor for which there were observations for all cells of the design for all participants. The fourth factor was task, with levels color, parity, and magnitude.
Results
Response latencies appear in Figure 1 and Table 1 , and error percentages appear in Figure 2 and Table 2 . The analysis below is separated into two sections, the first involving the full design and the second addressing Lag 2 repetition cost. Figure 1 shows response latencies separated by sequence (lines), trial (abscissa), and Lag 1 run (panels). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the full design revealed four main effects: se- quence, F(2, 70) Task) , which indicates that in the full analysis, they were driven by differences between Trial 1 and Trials 2-4. However, a main effect of trial (2-4) remained, F(2, 70) ϭ 3.9, MSE ϭ 8,947, p ϭ .026, 2 ϭ .10. This effect reflects a small but robust slowing pattern within a run of trials that, in the one theory that addresses this pattern, reflects decay of the current task representation in episodic memory (Altmann, 2002 (Altmann, , 2004 Altmann & Gray, 2002) .
Full Analysis
The remaining interaction contrasts in the full analysis (over Trials 1-4) were not reliable ( ps Ͼ .224 in all cases). In particular, no reliable interactions included both sequence and task, which means that Lag 2 repetition costs were not moderated by task effects. Figure 2 shows error percentages by trial (abscissa) and by Lag 1 run (lines). An ANOVA with the full design revealed a null sequence effect ( p ϭ .274) but reliable effects of trial, F(3, 105) ϭ 4.0, MSE ϭ 25.3, p ϭ .010, 2 ϭ .10; Lag 1 run, F(1, 35) ϭ 9.4, MSE ϭ 24.1, p ϭ .004, 2 ϭ .21; and task, F(2, 70) ϭ 13.0, MSE ϭ 50.0, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .27. The trial effect reflects an increase in errors across Trials 1-4 that, like the slowing effect noted above, replicates previous results linked to decay of the current task representation. The Lag 1 run effect complements the Lag 1 run latency effect, and the two together support the idea that the more time the Lag 1 task representation has to decay, the less it will proactively interfere with the current task, facilitating performance generally. No interaction contrasts for errors were reliable ( p Ͼ .140 in all cases).
Analysis of Lag 2 Repetition Costs
In Figure 3 , Lag 2 repetition costs are plotted as difference scores, which are computed as AЈBA and ABA latencies minus CBA latencies. The costs were analyzed with two parallel sets of ANOVAs; one compared AЈBA with CBA, and the other compared ABA with CBA. The general question was whether these parallel analyses would yield parallel sets of test outcomes; if so, Lag 2 repetition costs would seem linked to repetition of the task, which occurs in both cases, and not to repetition of the cue, which occurs only in the ABA case. The analysis is limited to response latencies, because errors showed no effect of or interactions with sequence in the full analysis above.
To set the stage, I ran an initial ANOVA to assess whether AЈBA and ABA sequences differed from one another. The sequence contrast was null, F(1, 35) Figure 3 suggests that the cost was larger on Trial 1 than on Trials 2-4. A separate ANOVA on Trials 2-4 revealed a main effect of sequence, F(1, 35) ϭ 12.4, MSE ϭ 7,628, p ϭ .001, 2 ϭ .26, which indicates that Lag 2 repetition cost was still reliable, and a null Sequence ϫ Trial interaction (F Ͻ 1), which indicates that the interaction over Trials 1-4 was in fact driven by a difference between Trial 1 and Trials 2-4.
Separate ANOVAs were performed on each level of Lag 1 run and trial. For a Lag 1 run of 2 trials (see Figure 3 For a Lag 1 run of 3ϩ trials (see Figure 3 , right panel), there was a sequence effect on Trial 1, with a Lag 2 repetition cost of 57 ms, F(1, 35) ϭ 17.3, MSE ϭ 10,293, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .33, and a marginal sequence effect on Trial 2, with a Lag 2 repetition cost of 8 ms, F(1, 35) ϭ 3.2, MSE ϭ 1,036, p ϭ .080, 2 ϭ .09; the sequence contrast was null on Trials 3-4 (F Ͻ 1 in both cases). The error terms from these eight sequence contrasts were the bases for computing the upward-pointing error bars in Figure 3 , which are within-participants confidence intervals (Equation 2 of Loftus & Masson, 1994) .
ABA versus CBA. A sequence (ABA, CBA) ϫ Trial ϫ Lag 1 Run ϫ Task ANOVA revealed the same four main effects as the sequence (AЈBA, CBA) analysis above: sequence, F(1, 35) Separate ANOVAs were performed for each level of Lag 1 run and trial. For a Lag 1 run of two trials (see Figure 3 , left panel), there were sequence effects on Trials 1-3, with a Lag 2 repetition cost on Trial 1 of 80 ms, F(1, 35) Figure 3 , right panel), there was a sequence effect on Trial 1, with a Lag 2 repetition cost of 54 ms, F(1, 35) ϭ 10.1, MSE ϭ 15,475, p ϭ .003, 2 ϭ .22, but not on Trials 2-4 (F Ͻ 1 in all cases). The error terms from these eight sequence contrasts were used for computing the downward-pointing error bars in Figure 3 , which are again within-participants confidence intervals.
In sum, then, Lag 2 repetition costs followed the same pattern for AЈBA sequences as for ABA sequences. The only contrast that differed across the two cases was the one for Lag 1 Run 2, Trial 4, which showed Lag 2 repetition cost for AЈBA but not for ABA.
Discussion
The main question of interest was whether tasks or task cues would be backward inhibited and would produce Lag 2 repetition cost. Had it been cues, an AЈBA sequence would have behaved as did a CBA sequence and would have produced no Lag 2 repetition cost. Instead, AЈBA sequences produced the same pattern of Lag 2 repetition costs as did ABA sequences, across a wide range of contrasts. A less clear outcome was possible, in that Lag 2 repetition cost could have been smaller for AЈBA sequences than for ABA sequences but still detect- Note. 3ϩ ϭ all Lag 1 runs of 3 trials or longer.
able, but the results were unambiguous: Lag 2 repetition costs in aggregate actually trended larger for AЈBA sequences than for ABA sequences (see Figure 3) . The implication is that cognitive control in task switching involves representations that are independent of the cues that signify them but that are specific to the current task; these are the representations affected by Lag 2 repetition cost. Thus, cueindependent, task-specific representations are necessary for explaining task-switching performance, contra the proposal that task switching can be modeled without switching tasks (e.g., Schneider & Logan, 2005) . Moreover, "mediator" representations, which could have explained similar previous results (Gade & Koch, in press; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003) , cannot explain the current results, because, per the model, as most recently characterized (Logan & Schneider, 2006) , mediators are not used with transparent cues. Increasingly, then (see also Altmann, 2006; Mayr, 2006; and Monsell & Mizon, 2006) , it would seem that the compound-cue model, even as elaborated for explaining why cue-switch cost is often less than task-switch cost (Logan & Bundesen, 2004) , has limited explanatory value with respect to the larger range of behavioral phenomena associated with cognitive control in task switching.
The present results seem to offer two new constraints on the mechanisms behind Lag 2 repetition cost. First, as others have foreshadowed (Schuch & Koch, 2003) , backward inhibition of the Lag 2 task seemed to affect multiple processes involved in current performance. The evidence is that Lag 2 repetition cost was reliable on Trials 2-4, at least for Level 2 of Lag 1 run length (see Figure 3 , left panel), but was substantially larger on Trial 1. This cost difference between Trials 2-4 and Trial 1 seems unlikely to be a scaling effect of the overall latency difference between Trials 2-4 and Trial 1 (see Figure 1) , because a scaling effect would not then explain the pattern at Level 3ϩ of Lag 1 run length (see Figure 3 , right panel); there, Lag 2 repetition cost was near zero on Trials 2-4 (2 ms, ns), meaning that there was no scaling effect that would explain the Lag 2 repetition cost on Trial 1 (which was still substantial, at 56 ms). It seems, then, that inhibition affected not just stimulus-or response-related processing common to all trials but also cue-related processing limited to Trial 1. In terms of underlying mechanism, it could, for example, be that inhibition is applied to some general semantic representation of the Lag 2 task to facilitate the switch to the Lag 1 task, and that this inhibitory influence then affects all processes that draw on that representation in some way during the switch back to the Lag 2 task-including encoding of the cue for that task, encoding of the stimulus dimension relevant to that task, and retrieval of response mapping relevant to that task.
A second new finding was that Lag 2 repetition cost decreased with time elapsed since inhibition was hypothetically applied to the Lag 2 task. Previous evidence on this point comes from Gade and Koch (2005) , who varied the interval between response on one trial and cue onset on the next: the responsecue interval, or RCI. A longer Lag 2 RCI-that is, a longer RCI after the Lag 2 trial-reduced Lag 2 repetition cost; the interpretation was that the Lag 2 task had more time to decay, such that less inhibition had to be applied to it for facilitation of the switch to the Lag 1 task, of which there was then less to affect the Lag 0 trial. However, a longer Lag 1 RCI did not reduce Lag 2 repetition cost; this suggests that inhibition, once applied, did not decay, at least over the period of Gade and Koch's longest RCI (1,900 ms). Here, in contrast, a longer Lag 1 run did reduce Lag 2 repetition costs (see Figure 3 , comparing panels), which suggests that inhibition, once applied, did decay. However, the Lag 1 run factor was also temporally somewhat coarse grained; within the 3ϩ level in particular, average run length was 4.9 trials (SD ϭ 2.31), meaning that aggregate latencies for this level would have been influenced by Lag 1 runs that lasted many seconds. Thus, the evidence here of inhibition decaying may not be inconsistent with Gade and Koch's finding of lack of appreciable decay after 2 s or so.
A remaining question is why Lag 2 repetition costs were robust despite the occurrence of trials on which the task was immediately repeated (Trials 2 and later of a run). In previous work, Philipp and Koch (2006) found that randomly occurring repeat trials reduced Lag 2 repetition costs overall; this finding suggests that inhibition was, at some global level, under strategic control and could be adjusted to reduce relevant costs in a context in which repeat trials could occur at any time. That study used a 1:1 cue-task mapping, and one possibility, suggested by effects such as increased taskswitch cost with a 2:1 mapping (Altmann, 2006) , is that the redundant cues needed for a 2:1 mapping contribute to general interference. If inhibition can help manage interference, its benefits here perhaps outweighed its costs, on balance. A future study, then, might ask whether Lag 2 repetition costs would be found as they were here, in a run-based design, if a 1:1 cue-task mapping were used for reducing representational clutter and thereby the need for inhibition. Note. 3ϩ ϭ all Lag 1 runs of 3 trials or longer. Figure 1 , by subtracting CBA from AЈBA and ABA. Error bars are 95% within-participants confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994 ; Equation 2) computed from the error terms for individual sequence contrasts, upward for AЈBA sequences and downward for ABA sequences.
